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Abstract
Studies of post-disaster rehabilitation tend to focus on the immediate vulnerabilities
of those who survive. Far less is written on the efforts focused on important longer
term human capacity development and organisational innovations needed to secure
a sustainable future for them. This study, set against the background of the 2004
Asian tsunami deals with the latter. It narrates the initiative of a development
assistance program in Aceh Province of Indonesia which was a collaborative effort
of the Food and Agriculture Organisations of the United Nations (FAO) and the
American Red Cross (ARC). It describes the strategy adopted in negotiating collective
action to foster a new co-management initiative aimed at reviving a small-scale
fishery and coastal communities, that were socio-politically isolated and bound by
customary practices, to collaborate with state and civil society. The study examines in
some detail the process adopted, its achievements and failures, the lesson learnt, as
well as its hopes for the future.
Keywords: Collective action, Co-management, Custom, Small-scale fisheries,
Organisations, Coastal community
Introduction
The natural disasters which struck the Asian Region over the past decades remind us of
the severity and scale of post-disaster vulnerabilities wrought on coastal communities
that are already economically and socially insecure. Important studies undertaken follow-
ing the disasters focus on the short-term, immediate physical and socio-economic vulner-
abilities of those who survived these tragedies as they recuperated and put together their
lives and livelihoods (Flint and Goyder, 2006; UNEP 2009; Jayasuriya and McCawley,
2010; ADB 2013) Less is written about the collective action, human capacity development
and negotiation of post-disaster organisational innovations undertaken with a mix of
strong community involvement, revival of customary practices, re-orienting state bureau-
cracies and instituting new legal procedures. (Birkmann et al. 2010; Birkland 1997, 2001).
This study is set against the background of the 2004 Asian tsunami. The tsunami
further exacerbated the collective and individual multi-faceted vulnerability of those
who survived in the coastal areas. These include: the loss of loved ones, particularly
women, children and the elderly; the resulting demographic conundrums and loss of
sense of community; the destruction of occupational assets and the consequent uncer-
tainty of livelihood options; the loss of housing and the associated fall in living
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standards and health; the psychological trauma of having survived the disaster and the
fears of not being able to cope.
The study narrates the initiative of a development assistance program along four
districts of the west coast of Aceh Province, Indonesia situated on the nothern end
of Sumatra island (see Fig. 1) between 2007 and 2010, which was a collaborative effort
of the Food and Agriculture Organisations of the United Nations (FAO) and the
American Red Cross (ARC) – hereafter referred to as ‘the Program’.
The study describes how the Program attempted to facilitate collective action by
various constituents in the disaster-affected small-scale fishing villages representing the
community, state and civil society. The focus of the collective action was to bring
together these constituents for negotiating a co-managed organisational
innovation. Each partner would have a spectrum of rights and responsibilities in
reviving a damaged fishery, addressing issues of livelihood enhancement and fostering
capability development for building greater resilience against future vulnerability.
The entities studied
The focus of this study is on a group of five organisational entitites, facilitated by the
Program, which commenced functioning in the west coast of Aceh Province of
Fig. 1 Map of Aceh Province, Indonesia
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Indonesia after 2008. These entities were not envisaged as conventional fisher organisa-
tions of the type well-known around the world – associations, cooperatives, unions and
so forth. Instead, they were based on the principle of co-management of fishery re-
sources for sustainable livelihoods by multiple interest groups – importantly the active
fishers, the youth and women in the coastal community, civil society and the represen-
tatives of the state. The entities were envisioned as an effort to ‘build back better’, given
the physical and socio-political complexities prevailing in the post-disaster context.
The study is based on the first hand knowledge of the author, who was a team mem-
ber of the Program and responsible for the co-management activities facilitating the
process of creating these entities between 2007 and 2010. The author re-visited the
Province in 2012 and 2013 to assess the post-Program fate of the entities. The material
used for the study includes the process notes maintained by the author (Kurien 2010),
secondary data (DKP Aceh, 2012) and extensive field discussions conducted during the
visits in 2012 and 2013. This study should be viewed as an ‘insider’ account of the or-
ganisational innovation process and its development. It is thus marked by the merits,
demerits and biases of such accounts. However, a conscious effort has been made to
examine the evolving dynamics of the entities from as ‘detached’ a perspective as
possible.
The main purpose of this study is to provide a brief diachronic analysis and analytical
description of the entire collective action process focusing on the dilemmas and
prospects of organisational innovations premised on co-management and their rele-
vance in post-disaster contexts.
The basis of collective action and understanding of co-management
The literature on collective action is premised substantially on the early work of Olson
(Olson 1967) which arises from an individualist oriented society where individual self
interest is taken to be the norm. In such a context, it is assumed that if coercion or select-
ive incentives are not offered, members of a large group will tend to act in a calculative
and self interested manner and will not pursue the collective good. Olson suggests that
members will tend to ‘free ride’ off the interest of those who support collective action.
The basis of collective action which was attempted to be fostered and negotiated by
the Program was not premised on these Olsonian assumptions. In the fallout of the
common and collective tragedy which beset the coastal communities of Aceh as a re-
sult of the tsunami, those who were spared the wrath of nature developed a strong
interpersonal commitment to work together. This is what Gilbert (Gilbert 2006) calls
“joint commitment” or Searle (Searle 2002) refers to as the “we intention” or “collective
intentionality”. This sense of “community” among the people of Aceh was also created
by the special socio-political history of the Province which we will describe below.
By co-management we are referring to arrangements of power sharing for resource
management between sections of the resource users/ beneficiaries and different
governance levels of the state. We envisage the process of co-management as a
dynamic context of organisational innovation involving wide ranging discussions,
capacity building and collective learning in which rights and responsibilities are jointly
crafted. Following on Jentoft et al. we consider co-management to be “about the
communicative and collaborative process through which rules are formed: who
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participates, how debates are structured, how knowledge is employed, how conflicts of
interest are addressed, and how agreements are reached” (Jentoft et al., 1998).
When a commitment for collective action is innate in the fabric of the society for a
variety of reasons which are both proximate and historical, then efforts to negotiate
institutional arrangements based on joint or co-management do have greater chances
of success. However, this does not do away with the possibility of individual ambitions
and perspectives getting the upper hand at times and introducing the ‘prisoner’s
delimma’ into these efforts. This could, in a large multi-interest group, result in
individual preferences trumping joint commitments as suggested by Olson.
Contextualising post-disaster Aceh
Aceh after the tsunami
Aceh Province grabbed world attention after Christmas Day of 2004.
On the morning of 26 December 2004, a gigantic and unprecedented earthquake with
a magnitude of 9.0 on the Modified Mercalli scale struck. It was followed shortly by
one of the largest tsunamis recorded in human history. These events took human lives
by the hundred thousands and severely damaged property as well as livelihoods, valued
at several billions of US dollars.
It has been estimated that in Aceh as a whole, between 15 and 20% of the total number
of fishers died in the tsunami, meaning about 14,100-18,800 individuals. A significant
share of the fishing vessels were destroyed and a major part of the fishery infrastructure
was also partially damaged and often beyond repair.
However, what is less well-known is that the tsunami radically altered Aceh’s political
and social context.
Aceh Province and its people had been experiencing a long-drawn, low-
intensity, socio-political conflict between the popular Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
(GAM) – Free Aceh Movement – the Indonesian central government and its
armed forces for nearly three decades (Reid 2006). This had led to political isola-
tion of the province from the mainstream development processes in Indonesia.
Despite the wealth of natural resources (land, oil, natural gas, forests, fish), Aceh
was considered a poor province of Indonesia. Finally, in October 2004, a peace
and autonomy agreement was carefully brokered between the Indonesian
Government and the GAM, with the former President of Finland (Martti Ahtisaari)
playing the role of arbitrator. It was the devastation of the tsunami, 2 months later,
which finally brought both parties together to demonstrate that they meant
business. A peace accord called the Helsinki Agreement was signed on 15 August
2005, 7 months after the tsunami (Kurien, 2007).
One significant provision in the Helsinki Agreement was that Aceh would have greater
control over the management of all its natural resources. This freedom was incorporated
into the Law on Governance of Aceh (LOGA) passed in 2006 by the Central Parliament
of Indonesia giving the Province of Aceh the rights to manage and utilize all its natural re-
sources – importantly, oil, gas, forests and fish – for the benefit of its people. This implied
not only control over revenues, but also freedom to make innovative and new institutional
and organisational arrangements. Herein lay the opportunity for the Program to foster
collective action and experiment with new organisational innovations in marine fisheries.
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Post-tsunami fishery aid
There have been few disasters in the world where marine fishing communities were so
totally devastated. The hallmark of the aid operations was the significant importance
given to the fishery and the coastal community. Aid agencies responded mainly by
making immediate arrangements for distribution of boats, which was seen as the most
obvious asset needed for survivors to make their livelihood from the sea.
However, in many villages the boats distributed were inappropriate for use at sea and
remained unused. A large number that were poorly constructed were also quickly
damaged at sea. Boats were in surfeit, while nets and other fishing gear were in short
supply. This prompted individuals to invest in not-so-expensive nets, such as
mini-trawls, just to make a living. These non-selective nets initially yielded high levels of
fish catch, which resulted in their rapid diffusion. Their negative consequences on the
coastal eco-system were ignored in the initial fervour of re-establishing livelihoods.
Individuals who were not customarily involved in fishing but lost their livelihoods as
a result of salinization of their land by the tsunami seawater, began to appear as labour
on the boats operating the mini-trawls. Fishing was not their forte. The traders who
financed the nets and boats hardly cared to make distinctions between good fishing
gear and gear that was destructive of the ecosystem, as long as they caught fish.
Gradually, tensions began to develop between the customary small-scale fishers who
were using passive, selective fishing gears governed by numerous customary norms and
those who used mini-trawls in total disregard of custom and the damaging effects of
such fishing on the eco-system.
Post-tsunami fishery
The fishery of Aceh was a beach-based, small-scale fishery before the tsunami and
continued to remain so after. According to the Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan
(Department of Ocean and Fishery – DKP for short), in 2001 there were 11,288 fishing
boats. Of this total, 88% were small-scale – i.e. non-motorised, fitted with an outboard
motor or below 5 gross-tonne capacity. As of 2004, the year of the tsunami, the number
of boats had increased to 15,576. However, by 2008 the number increased further to
17,584 reflecting the largesse of the development assistance and the larger-scale boats in-
creased from 12 to 20%. However, in 2011, after all the aid agencies which supported
post-tsunami technical assistance in fisheries had left, the number of boats in Aceh num-
bered dropped back to 15,995. This decline was significantly the result of the ‘mortality’
and ‘disuse’ of the poor quality and inappropriate tsunami boats. Of this total, the smaller
boats accounted again for 86% signalling that Aceh remained a small-scale fishery.
Custom and the fishery
The fishery of Aceh was dominated by customary practices for many centuries. The
head of the customary institution in the fishery was called the ‘Panglima Laot’, which
roughly translates as the ‘Sea Commander’. It is important to note that the individual
and the customary institution are known by the same name.
The Panglima Laot was an institution set up by the ruling Sultan of the erstwhile
Kingdom of Aceh about 400 years ago. Its prime function at that time was that of a
decentralized navy, intended for coastal protection. In more recent times, when the
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naval function lost its relevance, the individual Panglima Laot became the elected
leader of the fishing skippers or pawangs of each of the coastal settlements.
Each Panglima Laot controls a territory called a lhok’. The lhok is a socio-ecological
spatial unit composed of sea and coastal land. In its original structure, the Panglima
Laot (the institution) can be compared to a necklace. The beads are the lhok. The
string is the Hukom Adat Laot, the Customary Law of the Sea.
The Hukom Adat Laot contains norms and rules regarding access and allocation of
coastal resources. It also deals with the important issue of conflict resolution over these
resources. The rules are not written down but passed down from generation to gener-
ation by word of mouth and praxis. One of the tragedies of the tsunami was the death
of several of these customary leaders – many of whom were vanquished by the monster
wave while they assisted others in the community to seek safety. The coastal commu-
nity members who survived the tsunami almost immediately elected new Panglima
Laot. The new leaders were often either very young and inexperienced or old and
unprepared to take on the onerous responsibility. Given the circumstances, many who
were not full-time fishing skippers got elected. This was an exceptional situation
following the tsunami, only done to ensure the survival of this social institution.
It is important to note that during the decades of political isolation of Aceh from the
Indonesian mainstream, this customary context give the small-scale fishery a sense of
cohesion, identity and autonomy. In the post-tsunami context this was a major factor
in promoting collective action towards co-management.
Preparing the ground for fisheries co-management
It was against this background that the Program set to initiate its organisational
innovation efforts using the new approach of co-management activities. The focus was
on bringing together youth from the coastal communities, fishers and the officials of
the DKP in the four western districts of Aceh most affected by the tsunami.
The process of negotiating co-management initially involved a three-fold strategy: (1)
awareness creation, (2) capacity building and (3) field action. Those who participated as
the key interest groups included: young men and women from the coastal community,
the members of the Panglima Laot and the representatives of the state (primarily staff
of the fishery departments (DKP) of the districts and the province).
As many as 400 individuals from the above mentioned groups, representing four dis-
tricts of the western coast of Aceh, were directly involved in all aspects of the strategy
for over a period of 3 years (2007–2010). Some of the important details of the different
awareness raising, capacity building and field action programs initiated are described as
they were the foundation for fostering collective action to create the new organisational
innovation based on co-management. The initial field activities of co-management were
rejuvenation and conservation of marine resources destroyed by the tsunami as well as
livelihood restoration of coastal communities.
Awareness
Foundations for co-management
In 2007, awareness creation products were widely disseminated in the coastal areas to
highlight the meaning and relevance of co-management. These included posters,
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brochures and calendars using idiomatic expressions found in Acehnese culture and Islamic
teachings to sensitise people about the need to work together to ‘Sustain the Sea’ – or
‘Peujroh Laot’ in Acehnese. The services of the Panglima Laot network were ensured for
dissemination of these products through the kadai kopi (coffee shop) in each lhok and also
during the community meal after breaking of the fast during the holy month of Ramadan.
Following this awareness campaign, the issue of a training course for young men and
women of the communities was mooted in all of the four districts. The key leaders of
the village – customary, religious and official – were contacted. The criteria for selec-
tion were mutually agreed upon. This ensured collective support for the selection and a
moral obligation for the youth to serve the lhok after the training.
Capacity building
Youth for responsible fisheries
The training course lasted 3 weeks and focussed on skills for community organisation and
technical and social aspects of fisheries co-management. It was composed of knowledge in-
puts and a learning-by-doing process involving a participatory pedagogy. A cadre of 164
youth (33 women) who were enthused and committed to the cause of community action
for fisheries co-management was formed. These youth went back to their villages to play
the role of ‘creative irritants’ in the formation of the new co-management organisational en-
tities. They were named Motivator Masyarakat (Community Motivators) or MM for short.
Fishers for co-management
At the Panglima Laot Provincial Convention in December 2007, the author made a
presentation titled “Fisheries Co-management: Is it Relevant for Aceh Today?” This was
the first occasion when this concept was discussed by fishers in Aceh. Capacity building
of the fishers later took the form of meetings and workshops at the provincial and dis-
trict levels.
The Panglima Laot had been largely in an ‘adversarial’ position vis-à-vis the state dur-
ing the three decades prior to the tsunami. The idea of collaborating with the state was
hence not readily acceptable to many of the individual Panglima Laot. As custom pro-
vided the coastal community with an ‘identity’, it was important to foster customary
practices which helped to assert the rights of the coastal community over the fishery re-
sources. Most important was the role of conflict resolution on matters relating to the
fishery for which the Panglima Laot authority was accepted by the police, navy and the
civil administration.
Re-orienting the officers
Many of the staff of the DKP had no earlier fishery education or training. Conse-
quently, many of them were reluctant to visit the coastal areas, shy of exposing their
ignorance to the community and the Panglima Laot.
First, a small group of key officers from the districts and the provincial level were
selected for a study tour of Malaysia to expose them to the fisheries management
approach of that country. The choice of Malaysia for the study tour ensured that there
were no inconveniences from the point of view of language, food habits, and religious
practices. This ensured that the participants could focus full attention on the lessons to
be learnt. The trip exposed the officers to a wide range of management practices and
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convinced them about the need for greater resource management and conservation in
Acehnese fisheries and the significance of coastal community participation in these.
Short duration fisheries co-management courses were offered focussing on officers at
the district level. The pedagogy focussed on a process of ‘group discovery of realms of
ignorance’ to prevent any ‘loss of face’ by individuals officers. The use of role play, case
studies and games made the process of overcoming one’s ignorance and lack of know-
ledge an enjoyable endeavour. The training focused on the significance of small-scale
fisheries and the four components of management, including conservation, regulation,
allocation and rejuvenation. The role and challenges of multi-stakeholder fishery
governance in the new Aceh political context was also debated.
The training was intentionally devised to also highlight that inter-district
coordination is more important for managing a fugitive resource like fish than it is for
land-based activities. The personal rapport developed between the officers of the
districts was a significant factor towards fostering future cooperation. In addition, the
rapport that they developed with the Program staff greatly helped the latter when
facilitating the co-management initiatives.
Field action
Fisheries co-management in action
The first step towards putting fisheries co-management into action was taken in September
2008 by an informally constituted co-management forum in each district. The lead role in
putting together this initiative was taken by the cadre of enthusiastic MMs in each district.
The forum became a vehicle for getting on board the PL members, DKP staff and
also the authorities involved with general administration and governance of the district
and villages. They discussed the nitty-gritty details of putting co-management into ac-
tion. The main outcome was that five fishery co-management entities were initiated in
different parts of the west coast of Aceh between late 2008 and early 2010.
Legal framework for governance
The legal framework for constitution of the entities was the Surat Kepatusan (SK),
which is a decree of the Bupati (District Head). Although the SK had a very lowly
position as a legal instrument, it served as authorization “for exercising rights over a
designated space, by a defined group of persons, for the good of society.”
Dynamics of the co-management entities
The plans for action made by the new co-management entities (see Table 1 below) and
the concrete dynamics of their functioning were not always in tandem. This was due to
a host of specific social situations and political happenings in Aceh from which the
entities could not be insulated. What follows is a brief enumeration of events and
processes in the five entities between 2008 and 2013.
Aceh Besar District
Aceh Besar District is the northern most district of Aceh Province. It surrounds Banda
Aceh, the capital city of Aceh Province. Co-management action was initiated in Lhok
Lampuuk by the keen interest of Panglima Laot Pak Daud. The MMs, who were young
Kurien Maritime Studies  (2017) 16:21 Page 8 of 21
fishers, helped to create wider linkages with the community. Some senior officers of
the District DPK who had visited Malaysia, were committed to experimenting with the
idea of co-management. Together they worked towards formation of the legal entity
called Kawasan Bina Bahari (KABARI).
Kawasan Bina Bahari (KABARI)
The aim of the KABARI was to promote safe, legal and responsible fishing practices;
link up with the tourism industry on the beach to protect the coastal zone resources
both on the land and sea; and promote safe and responsible domestic tourism.
The persistent efforts of the Executive Body of the KABARI convinced tourist
entrepreneurs about the benefits of collective regulation of their activities. In 2012, an
association of 39 ikan bakar (fish grill) stalls on the beach was formed. Together they
were able to ensure the beach’s cleanliness by getting as many as 15 persons to invest
in pay-and-use shower and toilet kiosks on the beach.
The fishers of KABARI, a total of 70 individuals, owned 25 boats and sold most of
their reef fish to the fish grill stalls at remunerative prices. They also shared four large
FAO constructed fibre-glass boats. When not fishing, the boats were rented out as tug-
boats to entrepreneurs who had started joy rides in the bay. An arrangement was made
wherein one share of the earnings from the use of the boats was given to the Panglima
Laot welfare fund for fishers.
The DKP provided KABARI with over IDR193 Million (US$18,300) for conservation
initiatives in coral reef and turtle conservation. The Department of Forestry provided
saplings and training for coastal afforestation. The Department of Tourism funded a
stage on the beach where music performances could be held and trained 100 KABARI
Table 1 Indicators on the five co-management entities (in geographic order from north to south
along the west coast)
Name of entity
(Date of start)
Villages; Fishers;
Coastline length
Number of Facilitators
(PL = Panglima Laot
MM= Community
Motivators
DKP = Fisheries Staff)
Planned activities
KAWASAN BINA
BAHARI
(August 2009)
5 1 PL Foster multi-stakeholder interests in the sea
and coastal ecosystem in a peri-urban
setting: fishing; tourism; livestock rearing;
coastal afforestation; industry
70 3 MM
2 km 2 DKP
KAWASAN
PEUDHIET LAOT
(November 2009)
10 1 PL Map and protect small islands; create a fish
sanctuary; replant corals; protect small island
ecosystems; plant mangroves171 7 MM
25 km 2 DKP
KAWASAN RAMAH
LINGKUNGAN
(October 2008)
5 2 PL Map and protect the bay; create a fish
sanctuary; replant corals; plant mangroves;
regulate fishing; develop women’s
supporting activitites
378 5 MM
9 km 2 DKP
KAWASAN PEUJROH
LAOT
(August 2009)
8 2 PL Propagate merits of selective fishing; take
political and moral initiative against
mini-trawling; foster more gender balance
to support responsible fisheries
1031 4 MM
8 km 4 DKP
KAWASAN BEUJROH
LAOT
(July 2009)
10 5 PL Develop active community surveillance
against illegal fishing; move towards
small-scale selective fishing; coastal
afforestation
445 10 MM
35 km 4 DKP
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sponsored community members in the etiquette and practices of community-oriented
tourism resulting in greater sense of participation of the whole community in tourism.
KABARI linked up with a local Acehnese student NGO called Coalition for Advocacy
of Aceh’s Sea. This committed group of university students took the initiative for turtle
protection. With the support of the District DKP, they constructed an olive ridley turtle
‘grow out’ tank. The Aceh Conservation Board undertook training for 45 persons on
various aspects of coastal conservation.
The MM team in KABARI became the key ‘networker’ among the different
stakeholders.
The continuity in the top leadership of DKP was an important factor in sustaining
the state’s executive interest in the initiative. This happened despite the changes of the
Bupati in the District.
KABARI conducted quarterly meetings of its Executive Board. They discussed man-
agement and governance issues more frequently on an informal basis. One weaknesses
of this informality was the lack of records and hence institutional memory – a lacuna
they became aware of when requested to submit their official records for audit as a
prelude to obtaining more state assistance.
Pak Daud understood the close and concrete inter-linkages between forest
conservation in the nearby hills and the productivity of the sea. This was one of his
chief concerns. His moral leadership in the initiative was crucial in maintaining and
consolidating the spirit of the KABARI –while also highlighting it as an eco-system
linking initiative.
The co-management entity flourished and grew due to strong leadership, the fishers
having a major stake in it, committed support of the state and enthusiastic participation
by the local business community. Factors such as proximity to the capital, the growing
popularity of Lhok Lampuuk as a local tourist spot and several unintended fortuitous
circumstances like links with good NGOs also greatly contributed to success.
Aceh Jaya District
Aceh Jaya District lies south of Aceh Besar district. Two co-management entities were
instituted there.
Kawasan Ramah Lingkungan (KRL)
The Kawasan Ramah Lingkungan (KRL) of Aceh Jaya was the first co-management en-
tity started in October 2008. A large bay near Calang, the capital of Aceh Jaya, was
chosen as the site for the initiative by an MM from Lhok Rigah. The Program chose a
Community Organizer to reside with the community to facilitate getting the stake-
holders to work together.
Training for coral replantation and scuba diving was organized. The Department of
Tourism provided scuba diving gear to the trainees. The training and the gear together
it gave a boost to conservation of corals destroyed by the tsunami. There was huge
community participation for coral mapping and replantation with perceptible increase
in fish life in the bay and hence giving the initiative strong support from the fishers.
The DKP staff provided proactive and keen leadership. Exciting results were visible in
3 months. The Bupati came personally to Lhok Rigah and took a boat ride to observe
the quick rejuvenation of biomass and growth of corals.
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The Secretary of DKP Aceh Jaya and two officers involved with the Program ensured
that co-management was fully integrated into the thinking, the policy making and the ac-
tual financial planning of the DKP. They were proactive in getting support of the Province
DKP as well as from the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) in Jakarta to
further the idea of co-management as a form of governance of fishery resources.
Financial support from DKP and the Aceh Jaya parliament (through the Aceh auton-
omy funds) amounted to about IDR950 million (US$86,000). Until 2010, the funds
were utilized for, inter alia, construction of small office facilities, purchase of diving
gear, site mapping, funds for creation of a master plan for the district, funding of semi-
nars and community awareness events to publicize the concept of collective conserva-
tion. The budget for 2013 included allocation for providing training for diving and
purchasing a small monitoring and surveillance vessel.
Fishing in the KRL area was strictly controlled and monitored. The use of selective fish-
ing gear was mandatory. The number of full-time fishers did not increase between the
years 2008-2012 and remained at about 370 persons. It was reported that catches in the
bay area were higher than before. However, no statistics were maintained at the KRL.
A women’s group was formed by the Community Organizer and the two young
women MMs of the area. The women (mainly wives of the fishers) were very enthusias-
tic and availed of special training to manage their savings and credit union. They called
their group Kelompok Amal Usaha Mandiri (KAUM) – meaning Group for
Undertaking Independent Business.
The history and the data obtained from the KAUM was impressive. Their objective
was to facilitate the small-scale enterprise initiatives. They were an integral part of the
discussions on sustainable fishing and the benefits of co-management and acutely
aware of the credit crunch of their husbands who wished to purchase selective fishing
gears required. They started with 35 members in 2009 and their own savings of IDR30
Million (US$2700). By 2013, they had enrolled 85 members. They negotiated a grant
from an NGO of IDR60 million (US$5500). A large share of the credit was offered to
their husbands to buy fishing gear. By the end of 2012, circulating the initial capital,
they had disbursed 234 loans valued at IDR663 million (US$60,000), of which 65% was
for purchasing fishing equipment. The remainder was utilized for small enterprises
such as setting up retail stores and coffee shops; capital for cake making; and for
educational purposes.
The DKP of Aceh Jaya established links with the Fisheries Faculty of the local univer-
sity. Though this link, students spent time in Lhok Rigah as part of their community-
interaction curriculum. Over 75 students participated in this program during 2011-12.
In 2012, the Province DKP invited MMAF in Jakarta to visit Aceh Jaya to study and
evaluate the co-management and conservation achievements in Lhok Rigah. Based on
this evaluation, the Bupati re-issued the SK incorporating more provisions to
strengthen the co-management and conservation procedures in the KRL area, including
special demarcation of ‘no-go’ zones with buoys and further extension. The MMAF
also allotted funds for further support to KRL activities.
In early 2013, a series of socio-political events, created an unexpected turn of events.
These events led to the MM departing from the village and the DKP Chief losing his
job. The newly appointed Chief had no fisheries background and little interest in re-
source conservation or management. As part of his own reorganisation process, staff
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who were strong supporters of co-management and also DKP representatives on the
EB of KRL were transferred out to other departments.
Concurrently, a businessman, after negotiating with the Chair of KRL (who also
served as the Village Head of Rigah) in his official capacity as Keuchik, set up a kadai
kopi and stalls for people to relax on the bay-front. This resulted in ipso facto
privatization of the bay-front. Though the Village Head had the authority to grant this
permission, he had violated the collective spirit and the SK provisions of KRL that he
headed. This fact was not lost on the people. However, they did not question the
Head on the conflict of interests, due to the problematic fact that he held two posts,
one as Village Head and the other as Chair of KRL.
The unexpected decline of this co-management entity was as rapid as its rise. The
growing differentiation in the socio-economic and political realities of Aceh was taking
its toll on the nascent organisational innovation.
Kawasan Peudhiet Laot (KPL)
The co-management entity in the northern end of Aceh Jaya was called Kawasan
Peudhiet Laot (KPL) and started in 2010 just when the Program was winding up. The
realm of KPL consisted of a panoramic bay and numerous small islands where illegal
and destructive fishing by fishers from other lhok was the seemingly irresolvable prob-
lem. The completion of the Program and the relative physical isolation of KPL provided
the entity with its own merits and risks. Though it forced people to be more self-reliant
and innovative, it could also sap enthusiasm. Given these challenges, the post 2010
initiatives of KPL were impressive.
The DKP attempted to compensate for its ‘distance’ by providing the KPL entity with
an office building costing IDR115 million (US$10,500) and by ensuring the speedy
mapping of the site, making official pronouncements of its existence and informing
MMAF in Jakarta.
The KPL established its own patrolling squad to keep away illegal fishers and those
using bombs. At times, the squad was questioned by the illegal fishers (and also
sometimes by the police) about their legitimacy and authority to take such conservation
measures in the open access realm of the sea. This did not deter them but rather made
KPL more determined to further develop their conservation area and for it to be
recognized by the government.
Collecting their own funds, the KPL under the leadership of knowledgeable fishers,
took measures to erect a gate to enclose the natural nursery in the reefs between the
small islands. However, the gate was destroyed by the strong waves. This did not deter
the spirit of the community. The DKP quickly stepped in and provided IDR90 million
(US$8200) and technical assistance to solve the problem.
Completion of the USAID road to Banda Aceh brought the urban market of Banda
Aceh closer to them. This prompted the 170 fishers in the KPL to organize new measures
to get the best price for their lobster catches. Prices increased on average from
IDR170,000 per kg in 2011 to IDR220,000 per kg in 2013 (about US$15 to US$20 per kg)
during the season. They also set up a lobster ‘grow out’ habitat in the estuary using their
own understanding of lobster biology. The fishers also made a conscious shift to use more
species-specific and season-specific gillnets and driftnets. The pay-off for this transition
was significant, as fishers perceived their harvests to be of larger-sized lobster which
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secured higher prices. No greater incentive was required to enhance this trend towards se-
lective fishing. Women played a significant role in sustaining it as they took the initiative
of repairing and maintaining the delicate gillnets for their husbands.
There was an increase in the number of fishers from the original 170 to 200, with the
KPL Chief mentioning four important factors that contributed to the rise. The most
important was the fact that there were no other jobs in the area, so going back to
fishing (many stopped after the tsunami out of fear of the sea) seemed the most logical
option. Secondly, the market for fish had improved following the completion of the
road to Banda Aceh. Thirdly, there was much more fish as a result of the conservation
activities of the KPL, in particular the protection of juveniles. Finally, the fishers used
tsunami-aid, non-motorized boats since the fishing grounds are very close and this
resulted in very small operating costs associated with the work.
Though the support of the DKP was physically visible in the area (e.g. the office, the
maps, the fisher ID cards) and also appreciated by the KPL members, they lamented
the fact that the support of DKP was not appropriate to their real needs, which
included more fishing gear as well as more technical and infrastructure support for
conservation of the natural nursery and lobster growing.
Recent changes in the Panglima Laot created new tensions. The newly elected person
was not a fisher or skipper. He functioned more as a political middleman for one of the
provincial political parties of Aceh. The fishers of KPL did not want him to have a role
in their initiative.
What started as a bright potential for co-management was devolving to become more
a ‘community-alone’ managed realm with state patronage.
Aceh Barat District
Aceh Barat District is situated south of Aceh Jaya. The continental shelf of the district
is marked by a sandy bottom and devoid of any large coral reefs. The capital,
Meulaboh, was a historically important town known for its maritime contacts with the
Indian sub-continent. It was a major fishing port before the tsunami wiped out the
whole town.
Kawasan Peujroh Laot (KPeuL)
In September 2008, the Program received a request from the DKP in Aceh Barat to
attend a meeting to discuss the menace of mini-trawling in the district. This debate
surrounded the issue of whether or not mini-trawling was damaging the near-shore
resources and ecosystem. The meeting left no doubt about the highly contentious and
politically sensitive nature of the issue with high financial stakes and the interests of
the fish trader lobby on the block.
Soon, political pressure (not related to the mini-trawl issue) led to the DKP Chief
being transferred. His successor, a woman officer, was very clear-headed about the need
for a mini trawl-ban and requested the Program for assistance in making a study. All of
the MMs in the district (about 60 of them) were mobilized to make an assessment of
the ecosystem damage wrought by mini-trawls and the economic and employment
implications of a ban.
By early 2009, the study was complete and the investment to replace the mini-trawls
with more selective fishing gear was estimated. The DKP staff, encouraged by their new
Kurien Maritime Studies  (2017) 16:21 Page 13 of 21
woman Chief, supported the idea of forming a co-management entity and conservation
area in their district. This was realized in August 2009, when the Bupati proclaimed the
SK authorizing its formation in Ujong Drien village, which had taken a collective deci-
sion to using only selective fishing gear and not to adopt the mini-trawls. The entity
was named Kawasan Peujroh Laot (KPeuL).
The DKP and the Bupati finally took a strong stand against mini-trawls. However,
there was delay in stopping the trawls due to lack of clarity on whether the DKP had
powers of arrest. This wavering was interpreted by the fishing communities as a sign of
retreat and prompted them to organise street demonstrations against trawls sending a
clear message to the DKP, the district parliament and the Bupati to act.
Partly in response to popular sentiment, the parliament financially supported a gear-
swap offer made by DKP on the advice of the Program: those who turned in their mini-
trawls would be given other legally permissible gear in exchange. A sum of IDR850 million
(US$77,000) was allotted for the purpose.
The Bupati also organized a “mini-trawl burning ceremony” at his office premises
with attendance of officials from MMAF, the Province Water Police and other relevant
department heads in attendance with a large participation from the local coastal
population. At the suggestion of the Program, the Bupati also took the initiative of
calling the first inter-district fisheries meet to discuss coordination issues in fisheries
management, which resulted in the Meulaboh Declaration spelling out an approach for
responsible fisheries in west Aceh.
With popular support, strict enforcement, and use of rewards and punishment, mini-
trawls disappeared in Aceh Barat district. Many of them initially moved to the
neighbouring district of Nagan Raya, where they were subsequently banned from
operating by the Panglima Laot.
The success of the mini-trawl ban in Aceh Barat attracted nation-wide attention. The
DKP Chief of Aceh Barat was invited to many workshops where she took pride in
showing an amateur documentary on the process.
The lack of adequate funding for the DKP scheme for gear-exchange brought an end
to the initiative. Many mini-trawl owners could not get replacements and their mini-
trawls remained elusive and hidden. The merchants who financed the mini-trawls
orchestrated a protest claiming that many fishers were suffering due to the incomplete
transition program. They demanded immediate gear exchange or designated areas
where mini-trawl could be operated.
The KPL resisted these moves. In 2011, they proposed a 2-mile “no fishing zone for all”
and a zone between 2 miles to 4 miles as a “no trawl zone”. Unfortunately, the Panglima
Laot could not unite on these demands and it became clear that for some, the hukom
adat was becoming a hindrance to their own economic interests in the mini-trawl.
Amidst this stalemate, the District of Aceh Barat received a Charter of Honour from
the President of Indonesia for the initiatives taken in the fisheries sector. The award
was for the people of the entire district and received by the Bupati, who at that time
was in the thick of his campaign for re-election. There was a lot of cynicism among the
coastal communities about this award as they noticed that the Bupati had gradually
begun making compromises with the mini-trawl operators and the merchants. He
turned a blind eye to the creeping return of the mini-trawls, now even with the backing
of the district police force which also began getting a slice of the illegal pie.
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In the district elections of 2012, the current Bupati was defeated. This was clearly the
electoral handiwork of the vociferous coastal community who felt slighted by his be-
trayal of the struggle for sustainable fishing. The new Bupati’s views on the issue were
not yet openly known.
The DKP Chief who led the mini-trawl campaign was removed from her position by
the new Bupati. An officer who had spearheaded the co-management initiatives was
also transferred.
The coastal community was in a state of mild confusion with the open split in the
ranks of the Panglima Laot on the issue of mini-trawls. A class divide was emerging
among Panglima Laot, with lhok level PL leaders opposing the mini-trawl whereas dis-
trict and regional level PL representatives, who were not real fishers, favouring it.
The KAUM in KPeuL started well in Ujong Drien village in 2010 with 25 members.
Most of the members were wives of the fishers of KPeuL and they were keen to help
their husbands to purchase selective fishing gear. They decided to appoint the wife of a
military man in the village as their President, given her higher level of education and
public relations ability. These attributes were certainly useful to initiate the activities
and maintain the records. The capital of the KAUM reached a modest IDR35 million
by 2012 (US$3200). At this juncture, the President of the KAUM shifted residence from
Ujong Drien and took the capital of the KAUM along with her. After a long series of
negotiations, the women in Ujong Drien finally managed to get it back in 2013 and
hoped to revive their efforts after the embarrassing setback.
What prevailed is a rather demoralizing situation. Money power prevailed with the
state and fisher representatives compromised on the principle of responsible fisheries.
Many of the MMs in the forefront of the anti-trawl movement became disillusioned.
Happily, most of them were able to find small jobs which they attribute in large
measure to the training and exposure which they received from the Program. Some
MMs, who were fishers, continued to believe that a new future could be envisioned.
The power of politics and money seemed to have overwhelming uprooted this
co-management entity.
Nagan Raya District
Nagan Raya, a newly formed district, was the southern most district where the Program
undertook co-management activities. The district focused on plantation agriculture such
as oil palm. Its long sandy coastline is marked by extensive lush coastal forests and a
sparse coastal population residing away from the shoreline. One distinctive feature of the
district was the above-average quality of the MMs that participated in the Program.
Being a newly formed district the bureaucracy did not consist of very experienced
officers. Additionally, the departmental offices were situated in the newly constructed
district capital far away from the coast making contact with fishers and interest in
marine affairs slight.
There was no representation from among the fishery officers of Nagan Raya in the
Program exposure trip to Malaysia and just two attended the co-management training.
Kawasan Beujorh Laot (KBL)
The motivation for co-management activities came from the active group of MMs.
They wanted to match up with their MM colleagues in other districts. There was also a
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relatively strong contingent of lhok level Panglima Laot – all genuine, small-scale
fishers. Together they approached the Bupati with the proposal for creating the
co-management entity.
The DKP of Nagan Raya was initially reluctant to support the move. The pressure to
‘engage’ came after the banned mini-trawls from Aceh Barat moved into the waters of
Nagan Raya, causing outrage among the local fishers. At this juncture the DKP
supported the initiative to form the Kawasan Beujroh Laot (KBL).
Compared to the co-management entities in the other districts, the KBL had the
largest coverage of coastline, totalling 35 km. Their main focus of activities were to be
community participation in surveillance of illegal fishing, primarily the mini-trawls.
They aimed to move towards small-scale, selective fishing and undertake a major pro-
gram for coastal afforestation. Attempts to get the Nagan Raya parliament to allot
funds for a gear exchange program were not successful. Good beginnings were made
for the coastal afforestation scheme with involvement of the Department of Forestry.
The Panglima Laot at the lhok levels and the MMs took strong initiative for these initial
steps.
The KBL undertook no fishery activities due to the disinterest and inability of
the DKP to engage proactively with the Panglima Laot and the MMs. A junior offi-
cer, who had shown some interest in the Program activities, was transferred to an-
other department. In this context, the MMs were also disillusioned. As they were
adequately educated, some of the young men obtained jobs in government schools. Some
of the young women among the MMs got married and became focused on raising their
families.
The fishers on their own could not effectively block the mini-trawls coming from
Aceh Barat without support from the DKP and the Water Police. The Kawasan Beujroh
Laot (KBL) as an organisational structure remained an empty shell from the very start.
Assessing the co-management experience
Given the varied experiences, the ups and downs in the organisational dynamics, the
flourishing and the near demise of the entities, it was proposed to have a meeting of
the representatives of the five co-management entities in November 2013 in Aceh Jaya.
This review was sponsored by FAO and facilitated by the International Collective in
Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) as part of the preparatory initiatives for drafting of the
FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the
Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines).
At the meeting there was consensus that the entities provided a fresh set of institu-
tional initiatives within the context of the post-disaster vulnerabilities and the new
emerging challenges of the socio-political situation in Aceh after the Province attained
autonomy. The aggregate data on the coverage of the five co-management entities was
adequate proof of what was achieved by 2010. (See Table 2).
They also agreed that, against the background of the tsunami event, collective action
by communities and the state to rejuvenate resources and revive livelihoods gave
coastal people confidence and revived hopes for a better and sustainable future. There
was also the view that greater, structured networking between the entities would have
yielded mutual aid, particularly in times of organisational crisis.
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In the discussion which followed, two significant conclusions emerged about the core
objective and the organisational future of the entities.
Firstly, given amorphous membership and lack of rigid organisational form, it
was felt that there could only be a generalized articulation of the core objective of
the entities. After some discussions between the participants, this core objective
was spelt out as follows:
The overarching core objective is to collectively create the enabling conditions
in nature and society to facilitate peaceful and sustainable livelihoods for
coastal communities.
Secondly, it was accepted that the functioning of the entities as co-management
initiatives (with community, fishers and state involved as equal partners) was overtly
and covertly influenced both by the form of district governance under the
decentralization policies of the central government and the dynamics of the new
political processes within Aceh and Indonesia.
The specific mention of ‘peaceful’ in the core objective alludes to the memories of
the long period of violence and conflict which the Acehnese people had experienced
between 1980 and 2004. And yet it also expresses the hope that their organisational
initiatives will contribute to generating and sustaining peace, which is a prerequisite for
building sustainable livelihoods.
The fluidity of new politics in Aceh had already begun to take its toll on institutions,
which the people have considered as the bedrock of their era of isolation. The
fissiparous tendencies in the Panglima Laot point to this painful reality. While local face-
to-face communities had strong moorings in custom (adat), creating new forms of
governance involving different interest groups became a major challenge. The default
option was always to revert back to the comfort-zone of the immediate local community.
True parliamentary democracy in Indonesia is only just 15 years old. The Province of
Aceh as an experiment in autonomy within the federal context of Indonesia is just a
decade old. And the initiative at co-management of fisheries along the west coast of
Aceh has been functioning for less than 7 years. Instituting the co-management
initiative would not have been possible without the autonomy of Aceh and that in turn
would not have materialized without Indonesia having turned democratic.
For the proper functioning of democracy, autonomy and co-management, it
becomes imperative that a system of rights and responsibilities, exercised with trans-
parency and accountability, by the various interest groups who constitute the
institutions, becomes a stable reality. This process takes more time than has currently
been available for the country, province or entity. Assessing achievements of the co-
management entities at the lowest end of this hierarchy can only be indicative and
will not be a guide to future possibilities.
Table 2 Aggregate data on the five fisheries co-management entities and their coverage (as on 2010)
Lhoks Coastal villages Coast length (km) Population Fishers Craft
Total in five co-management entities 11 38 79 26,899 2095 388
Total for the four coastal districts 33 160 310 82,048 10,900 1092
Coverage (%) 33 24 25 33 19 36
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There has been no formal assessment of the material changes that have been
achieved as a result of the initiative. It will therefore be inappropriate to make any
strong statements about the outcomes and impacts it has made on improving assets,
incomes or food and nutrition security.
During the period when the entities functioned effectively – largely between 2008
and 2013 – the entities could be seen as ‘facilitators’ that created the enabling
conditions for any member of the community, whether it be youth, women, and men,
particularly fishers, to take actions that assisted them in pursuing livelihood options of
their choice. Such actions could be individual or collective. Our analysis of the
initiatives within the entities make it clear that such facilitation was possible only be-
cause of their ‘legal entity’ status, combined with the active or tacit support of the state.
The entities had, in varying degrees, asserted their legal rights over space and re-
sources and ensured that sustainable and responsible fisheries were undertaken. These
actions led to, even if only temporarily in some locations, improved income
possibilities. However, the impact of their actions on conservation of coastal resources
(coastal forests, mangroves, coral reefs, coastal waters) had been more pervasive, and
more importantly, had led to the community believing that protecting and rejuvenating
nature was possible by collective efforts with the participation of different interest
groups. This was a small but important step towards the community ‘doing conserva-
tion as a matter of routine’, rather than as a special action.
The entities have also shown that co-managed and less rigidly structured
organisations can foster collective action between different interest groups to achieve
common goals. However, sustainable continuity of the entities depends, inter alia, on
appropriate moral leadership and some degree of continuity in the political and
executive arms of the state.
Post-disaster organisational innovations: Lessons learnt
The decision of the Program to go for a non-conventional, organisational structure,
involving multi-stakeholder interests, was consciously taken to set out the collective
action possibilities for introducing co-management into new organisational innovations
in a free and autonomous Aceh Province.
The above review and analysis reveals both the prospects and the dilemmas at the
present and into the future for such co-managed organisations.
Firstly, in a human context, for these communities, which survived political isolation
and a huge natural disaster, the entities provided the material basis for collective action
to enthusiastically revive their relationship with the sea and its resources. Non-
conventional, co-managed organisational structures, based on collective action that
integrates the familiar and the new, can have therapeutic effects on traumatized,
vulnerable coastal societies.
Secondly, the preparatory human capacity building actions – for youth, fishers and
government officers – need to be viewed as a major investment in human capital for
which dividends go far beyond the immediate scope, activities and survival of the co-
management entities. Returns on human capital development to society take a longer
period though benefits to the concerned individuals may be more immediate. Channelizing
the human capital for the specific purpose for which it was intended is the challenge to be
addressed by the coastal communities that benefited.
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Thirdly, a system of networking between the entities should have been made an
integral part of the organisational design. Given the low-cost information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) possibilities available, this would not have been difficult to
design or implement. Networking of new, co-managed organisational initiatives must
be made part of the initial design and formation process – particularly because it
strengthens collective action. Networking should not be left as the final act after the in-
dividual entities are put in place.
Fourthly, from the review of the experience of the entities it is extremely clear that
the sudden termination of the ‘facilitation process’ (due to the closure of the Program)
was an important element in the faltering of some of the entities. Clearly then, exit
policies of international assistance programs must envision and provide support for
some minimal, follow-up, post-exit activities.
Fifthly, the amorphous nature of such co-managed organisations made informality
and familiarity take precedence over the need for structure and institutional memory.
Striking the right balance is imperative for organisational longevity.
Sixthly, the mainstreaming of women into the governance of the entities did not take
the priority it deemed. Though youth – men and women – from the communities were
credibly engaged, this could not substitute the essential involvement of the wives of
fishers into the core of the collective action needed to stabilise co-management
activities. Women, particularly wives of fishers, should be granted more than just a sup-
port role if these new organisations are to bring stable benefits for fishing communities.
Seventhly, in the entities where the product market (for fish) was vibrant and
expanding, the enthusiasm for conservation became ‘part of routine behaviour’. It laid
the basis for developing conservation-friendly markets. Sourcing and finding such
product markets, which place a premium on fair, social and environment friendly trade,
are realms where the involvement of civil society and state can be sought.
Eighthly, involvement of state in co-management can only be ensured if officers will
adopt a mindset that allows fishers and the community to be creatively involved in the
decisions which affect their lives. There is also a need for a modicum of long-term
tenure for officers. The permanence of community and the temporariness of the state
functionaries can make sustained collective action for co-management untenable.
Ninthly, moral leadership is an essential condition for such new organisational
initiatives. For an initiative that is marked with informality and an initial lack of form, there
must be an amalgam of personal and social characteristics to ensure success. Key to this is
leadership that can enthuse, create trust and goad people to collectively achieve goals.
Identifying and cultivating such leaders is imperative for organisational sustainability.
Finally, such co-managed organisations can be more prone to easy disbanding
following initial, small failures. Success and failures must never be viewed as events of
finality. These must be considered as part of an organisational building trajectory with
lessons to be learnt and internalized.
Conclusions
The primary purpose of this diachronic analytical description and reflective narrative
was to provide insights into the prospects and dilemmas of fostering collective action
in establishing new co-managed forms of organisational innovations in the small-scale
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marine fisheries sector. The post-disaster and post-conflict situation in Aceh, into
which this intervention was initiated, made its circumstance very unique.
Between 2004 and 2014 however, there have been numerous events around the world
where similar circumstances, individually or in combination, have struck coastal fishing
communities, including Chile, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Haiti, Japan and the Philippines to
name but a few. In all of these countries, one of the significant challenges with regard to
coastal community rehabilitation has been related to the post-event choice of institutional
and organisational design. There has been increasing recognition that sustainability of
relief and rehabilitation efforts ultimately rests on the success of collective action for the
organisational innovations which are created to move coastal communities towards re-
establishing their normal livelihoods with dignity and self-reliance. At times, it can also
provide local and sub-national sovereignty if the co-management arrangements are
accompanied by secure legal and dedicated governance frameworks.
It is in such contexts that organisational innovations based on co-management, which
draw upon the lessons of the past while creating a more participatory and multi-
interest group future, come to have increasing relevance. Collective action to create
such endeavors is an important therapy for coastal communities recovering from the
trauma of disaster and/or conflict. These post-event scenarios also provide the possibil-
ities for establishing new relationships between people and the resources of the sea.
The crucial ingredients for initiating such organisational experiments include: identi-
fying good leadership among the people; en-skilling youth with appropriate capacity;
orienting the state machinery and personnel towards more openness for involving com-
munities in decision making; ensuring some element of long-term tenure of positions
for state officials; setting up a minimal ‘process facilitation’; getting wives of fishers to
take a central role in the governance of these organisations; making resource rejuven-
ation and conservation a central element of livelihood pursuits; finding new markets
for fishery products and opportunities for new vocations which base themselves on the
‘existence’ rather than the ‘use’ values of the coastal resources.
The study also illustrates how the initial and evolving socio-cultural and political
nexus of the context in which an organisation is situated greatly conditions its sustain-
ability. This is particularly true for new co-managed organisations, which are yet to be
bounded by a welter of socially acceptable recognition.
For this very reason, multilateral development agencies, development donors, and the
state apparatus should be willing to take risks and provide support to those who
experiment with collective action initiatives to create such new forms of organisational
options for coastal communities and small-scale fishers. They need to learn from the
few examples such as the one in this case study.
Notwithstanding such support, in the final analysis, it is the sustained enthusiasm,
responsibility and determined self-reliance of the different interest groups initiating
collective action to form such new organisation innovations that provides the bedrock
for sustainability.
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